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Theory emerges out of reflection on practice. Indeed, we can say, with Ricoeur, that theory is imitative of practice.1 So it is that this paper begins with a supervisory case and that I return repeatedly to reflect 
on this case and a second case from the perspectives of my Kleinian ob-
ject relations theoretical orientation, my pastoral theological method, and 
my supervisory theory. These theories are rounded out through a discus-
sion of the interplay of anxiety and other dynamics in several modalities: 
in the individual and group supervisory process, in supervision of couples 
therapy, and in the impact of contemporary understandings of transference 
and countertransference upon the “teach/treat” dilemma in supervision. 
Reflection on practice is also the mainspring of ethics, which subjects both 
my practice and my theory to critical self-review. My thesis is that reflection 
on practice occurs in dialogue. It is object-relational, whether it occurs in 
the medium of practice in the supervisory relationship or among colleagues 
who practice this art.
THE CASE OF J WORKING WITH T
J was a 66-year-old supervisee with more than twenty-five years’ ex-
perience as a high school English teacher. She was a gifted soprano solo-
ist and church choir member who had excellent writing skills and often 
brought incisive illustrations from her knowledge of literary classics into 
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peer group case and interpersonal group seminars. However, a pattern of 
conflicts appeared in J’s occupational history. First she had conflicts with 
two high school principals to whom she reported. These conflicts, in which 
she felt “angry at the principal,” led J to resign from these teaching positions 
in which she “no longer felt safe, supported or understood.” At age fifty, J 
decided to leave teaching and go into ministry. After seminary, she began to 
have conflicts with judicatory officials to whom she reported. This prompt-
ed her to leave the roll of the United Methodist Church to become ordained 
in the United Church of Christ.
In her family of origin, J described her recently deceased mother as 
envious, hateful, and sabotaging of J from the time of her earliest memory. 
Mother had several psychiatric hospitalizations, and J survived childhood 
emotionally by attachment to her strong, loving father. In her nuclear fam-
ily, J has been married for forty-one years to a high school band teacher, and 
this relationship is warm and stable like her relationship to her father. They 
have three adult children, all married, and several grandchildren. She has a 
strong relationship with her oldest daughter. Her second daughter married 
a fundamentalist minister, and she excluded J and her husband, preferring 
instead to be “adopted” by her spouse’s fundamentalist parents and to re-
strict J’s access to the grandchildren. J is close to her married son, who lives 
two blocks from her and whose children she babysits. 
In spite of all her experience teaching adolescents, J was intimidated by 
her patient T, a seven-year-old boy diagnosed with conduct disorder who 
swore at her, called her a “bitch,” and contemptuously tried to order her 
around in the play therapy setting. This behavior alternated with episodes 
of affectionate relating to J. It was difficult for J to recover enough from T’s 
verbal assaults to assimilate my supervisory interpretations and the inter-
pretations of her peers. T’s behavior acted out his father’s behavior toward 
both his mother who brought him to therapy and toward the pregnant girl-
friend with whom the father lived. During T’s episodes of affection toward 
J, he acted out the other side of his split relationship to his mother, whom he 
also loved. J was a receptacle for T’s evacuations of the daily violence and 
contempt he witnessed in his home settings, as he lived sometimes with 
mother and sometimes with father and father’s girlfriend. Negative projective 
identification into J was T’s means to rid himself of the domestic violence that 
he could not metabolize. 
T was already court-ordered to therapy with J, but we regularly re-
viewed the case in supervision from legal and code of ethics perspectives 
AAPC DIPLOMATE THEORY OF SUPERVISION PAPER
171
to assess whether any additional “duty to report” issues had arisen, such as 
his possible exposure to abuse. Although father’s verbal behavior toward 
mother and girlfriend remained an ongoing concern, T’s behavior slowly 
improved and no legally reportable ethical incidents could be documented.
In individual and group supervision, J had difficulty thinking or re-
flecting on her therapeutic work with T. In J’s countertransference, she felt 
flooded by T’s violent regard for her as a bad mother (“bitch”)—a flooding 
similar to that inflicted by her own disturbed mother. T’s contempt toward 
his mother, his father’s girlfriend, and J herself was similar to J’s contempt 
for her own mother, for her high school principals, for her judicatory offi-
cials, and for the strong people in her peer group, all of whom were wom-
en. In response to T’s negative projective identification, J introjectively identified 
with T, feeling as though she portrayed the bad mother he projected into 
her. Less apparent, and more confusing, was J’s guilty feeling that she, like 
T, was a “bad, mother-hating child.” 
J agreed with my recommendation to resume personal therapy to do 
more intrapsychic work on these issues during the course of her training ex-
perience. Her mother-father split was also apparent in her fragile and per-
secutory supervisory transference to my female colleague in contrast to the 
more trusting and warm relationship she had with me. I liked J, but she 
often arrived for individual supervision feeling emotionally overwhelmed. 
She could describe what T did in the last therapy session and, with prompt-
ing, what she did in response. But, she was unable to articulate the psycho-
dynamic meaning of what was going on in her work with T or describe how 
she might deal more effectively with T in therapy. Our exploration of these 
issues and my interpretations seemed to restore J to a more solid mode of 
functioning by the end of the hour, but she arrived for the next session feel-
ing overwhelmed again, like she was starting all over. I would compare her 
learning progress in her work with T to the image of a stock market chart 
with many up-and-down spikes but displaying a very, very gradual upward 
slope. 
THE KLEINIAN THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
This supervisory case illustrates many phenomena described by Mela-
nie Klein and her followers. Kleinian object relations psychoanalytic theory 
comprises the core of my theoretical orientation, and since Klein’s pioneer-
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ing work began with the psychoanalysis of children, I will place J’s case in 
the context of Klein’s theory. Some history will be helpful. 
Klein’s perspective as a woman added immeasurably to psychoanal-
ysis in that her innate relationality and perspective as a mother and child 
therapist became a source of metaphors she developed to deeply under-
stand and describe psychodynamics. Although Freud spoke occasionally 
about “the object” and about patients’ “object relations,” it was Klein who 
elaborated and extended Freud’s theory to develop object relations psycho-
analytic theory. Throughout her life, she remained fiercely loyal to the basic 
tenets of Sigmund Freud, yet she was in theoretical disagreement with many 
ideas of Anna Freud and her colleagues of the Viennese diaspora who devel-
oped the ego psychology school of psychoanalysis.2 
Klein discovered that although little children are not able to lie on the 
couch and free associate like adult patients, they do, indeed, free associate 
through their play. This led her to develop her “play technique” in which 
she interpreted the child’s conflicts that are invariably acted out, or drama-
tized, through their play. She noted that more disturbed children suffered 
from inhibitions of play and that the most disturbed children were unable to 
play at all. For children, play is as much a window on the internal world as 
free association is for adults.3 
The play technique not only revolutionized the methods of child psy-
choanalysis but also helped Klein extend Freud’s theory and practice and 
led her to new discoveries. She realized that children need a proper psycho-
analytic setting just as do adults and thus moved her work with children 
away from their homes and families and into her own consulting room.4 In 
contrast to Hermine Hug-Helmuth and Anna Freud, Klein found that chil-
dren do, indeed, develop strong transferences to their therapist and that it 
is both unnecessary and not psychoanalytic to take an approach to child 
analysis that is “educative” or that avoids the child’s negative transference.5 
Moreover, Klein interpreted children’s erotic phantasies in straightforward 
language, using correct anatomical terms such as penis, vagina and breast.6 
The therapeutic results were dramatic as Klein worked with children, 
some of whom were very young.7 Moreover, this work led her to make ad-
ditional discoveries. First, whereas Freud dated the Oedipus complex as oc-
curring from ages four to six, Klein observed a little girl, “Rita,” age two 
years and nine months, who was having phantasies of her parents’ inter-
course that indicated Oedipal dynamics were already well under way. Sec-
ond, Rita’s night terrors of a “punishing mother” indicated that her super-
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ego was already taking her to task for her jealousy of her parents’ conjugal 
relationship that excluded her.8 Whereas Freud saw the superego as “a pre-
cipitate” at the conclusion of the Oedipus conflict (at age six),9 Klein found 
early superego and Oedipal dynamics in children before age three. Klein’s 
play therapy with children, in real time, contrasted with Freud’s retrospec-
tive investigation of child development through the lens of adult patients 
free-associating on the couch.10 Klein agreed that people pass through the 
developmental stages that Freud described, but she found they enter these 
stages earlier than he had thought. 
Working with very young children, Klein also discovered their ear-
ly relationships to “part-objects” such as the “good breast” and the “bad 
breast.”11 As cognition develops, children realize that the good breast and 
the bad breast belong to the same mother, whom they need and love. Nor-
mal splitting between the good and bad breast in the first months of life 
gives way to ambivalence toward mother, which is characteristic of “the de-
pressive position.”12 Children with developmental problems, due to either 
nature or nurture, have difficulty achieving the depressive position and ex-
perience frustration as acutely persecutory. When they suffer from persecu-
tory anxiety they are said to be functioning in the “paranoid-schizoid posi-
tion.”13 These developments led to Klein’s theory being known as a positions 
theory. She held that people oscillate between the paranoid-schizoid and the 
depressive positions throughout the life cycle. In clinical practice, Klein and 
her followers found that attending to moment-to-moment shifts in the pa-
tient’s position enabled them to make interpretations in the immediacy of 
the shifts the patient makes within his internal world. These discoveries also 
enabled them to work with patients who had personality disorders as well 
as other more deeply disturbed patients, both children and adults. 
For Kleinians, the depressive position, characterized by ambivalence 
toward the object, is equivalent to what Freud called the “normal neurotic” 
level of functioning, whereas the paranoid-schizoid position corresponds 
to functioning in the borderline-manic-psychotic range in which splitting 
is prominent. These positions are thought of as occurring on a continuum 
from adjustment disorders and mood disorders on the higher end to per-
sonality disorders and psychoses on the lower end of the range. Episodes of 
panic or outbursts of anger are examples of a relatively normal person’s mo-
mentary movement into and out of the paranoid-schizoid position. Kleinian 
therapists and supervisors are always attentive to the presence, and degree, 
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of fluctuations of persecutory anxiety in the patient’s functioning from mo-
ment-to-moment in the treatment setting. 
It is also critical for supervisors to monitor these fluctuations during di-
alogue with a supervisee. A spike in the patient/trainee’s persecutory anxi-
ety is a signal, in the moment, that a pause is needed to explore and interpret 
the anxiety. Empathic therapists and supervisors who are adept at this this 
can avoid many impasses before they blossom. As we know from William J. 
Mueller and Bill L. Kell,14 and from Bion,15 too much anxiety blocks the pa-
tient/trainee’s capacity to learn from experience. On the other hand, too lit-
tle anxiety deflates motivation to participate in therapeutic and supervisory 
experiences in which learning occurs. As with Goldilocks and her soup, the 
anxiety level should be “just right.” 
The leading post-Kleinian theorist is W. R. Bion. He extended and elab-
orated Klein’s theories in penetrating ways, centering on the deepest pro-
cesses of mental functioning. Reverie, containing, and alpha function are three 
such processes. Reverie is a mother’s 
state of calm receptiveness to take in the infant’s own feelings. . . . Having 
taken in the infant’s feelings, she then gives them meaning (containing). 
The idea is that the infant will, through projective identification, insert 
into the mother’s mind a state of anxiety and terror which he is unable 
to make sense of and which is felt to be intolerable (especially the fear of 
death). Mother’s reverie is a process of making some sense of it for the 
infant, a function known as ‘alpha function.’ Through introjection of a 
receptive, understanding mother, the infant can begin to develop his own 
capacity for reflection on his own states of mind.16
Applied to the roles of therapist and supervisor, the functions of reverie, 
alpha function, and containing are Bion’s ways of understanding elements 
of the therapeutic and supervisory process. The therapist or supervisor pro-
vides a calm reception of the patient’s/trainee’s projections or transferences 
(reverie), she digests these inchoate projections into material ready for think-
ing (alpha function), and through interpretations (hypotheses), she returns 
the material to the patient/trainee for use in therapeutic or supervisory re-
flection and exploration (containing).17 
Through reverie, the therapist/supervisor seeks contact with the font 
of psychic activity, the point where human instinct crosses over from soma 
to psyche. For Klein and Susan Isaacs,18 instinct emerges into psychic life as 
unconscious phantasy. As R. D. Hinshelwood puts it,
When Isaacs called unconscious phantasy the ‘mental representative 
of instinct’ she conveyed a conversion process of some kind across the 
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body/mind discontinuum. Bion gave the conversion process the name 
‘alpha function’ and began to fill in the clinical detail. . . . The term ‘alpha 
function’ stands for the unknown process involved in taking raw sense 
data and generating out of it mental contents which have meaning, and 
can be used for thinking. These resulting products of alpha-function are 
alpha elements.19 
Symbol formation is based on alpha function. Words, numbers, math-
ematical signs, religious images and gestures, artistic productions, etc., all 
emerge from the realm of unconscious phantasy via alpha function to inhab-
it the kingdom of symbols. Speech, text, and thinking are all symbolic; feel-
ings also cross over the body/mind discontinuum to be expressed in words, 
gestures, actions, or acting out. So, Klein and her followers would concur 
with Paul Ricoeur’s dictum that “the symbol gives rise to the thought.”20 
The “talking cure,” and the supervision of persons learning this art, live 
in the kingdom of symbols. Moreover, we need these healing arts because 
we live in an imperfect world where people not only misuse symbols and 
language, but at times alpha function itself malfunctions, thoughts become 
bowdlerized into delusions and hallucinations, and mental illness develops. 
As Hinshelwood puts it,
When alpha-function goes wrong or fails, another (abnormal) kind of 
mental content is generated, which Bion called beta-elements. [These] . . . 
particles of ‘undigested’ sense data accumulate . . . [or] agglomerate into 
collections . . . (a schizophrenic’s ‘word salad’ type of speech). These ac-
cumulations are processed by evacuation, not by thinking thoughts into 
dreams and theories. The process of evacuation is that described by Klein 
as projective identification in its pathological form.21 
Two notable Kleinians who pioneered psychoanalytic work with the 
defective mental processes of psychotic patients were Bion22 and Herbert 
Rosenfeld.23 They and their colleagues also identified elements of psychotic 
process in neurotic patients which, when understood as such, can be treated 
more effectively.24 
A SUPERVISORY REVISITATION OF J’S TREATMENT OF T
As J’s supervisor, my Kleinian perspective enabled me to recognize 
three factors in this case. First, J failed to maintain a state of reverie because 
she was overwhelmed by T’s hostile, intrusive, negative projective identi-
fication. T needed to evacuate the intrusive rage he saw his father act out 
on his mother and on father’s girlfriend—a rage that flooded and over-
whelmed T’s own childhood capacities to metabolize this experience. T’s 
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only recourse was to “identify with the aggressor” (father) and seek to over-
whelm his female therapist as father did to the women in his own life. The 
second factor was J’s reception of T’s violent projections. J’s history of being 
violently overwhelmed by her mother’s negative projective identifications 
left her vulnerable to similar events later in her life, including negative and/
or suspicious feedback from school principals, from church judicatory offi-
cials, from her female peers, from her own fundamentalist-convert daugh-
ter, and now even from T—a seven-year-old boy patient. Her personality 
structure as her mother’s daughter set J up to introjectively identify with 
others’ negative projections that she could not metabolize. Third, I helped J 
understand and interpret T’s use of what Klein termed manic defenses, which 
he internalized from his father. T denied his own weakness, vulnerability, 
fear, and depression by imitating his father’s omnipotent behavior of ag-
gression and disparaging triumph over others. He sought to control his 
mother and his therapist while idealizing his father’s antisocial behavior 
that was destructive of others and ultimately of self as well. The manic de-
fense was all too toxically familiar to J, whose mother had used it on her. My 
supervisory stance gave a calm receptivity (reverie) to J’s confusion and de-
spair. In reverie, my alpha function converted experiences J could not digest 
into thoughts or interpretations ready for J to use in thinking, functioning, 
interpreting, and reflecting from a professional ethics perspective as a thera-
pist to T rather than as his victim.
My supervisory interpretations of these phenomena during individual 
supervisory sessions restored J’s capacity to relate as a competent therapist/
mother to T in the next session. But her incapacity to hold onto these inter-
pretations in her sessions with T reflected her need to return to individual 
psychotherapy to shore up her identity vis-à-vis the destructive negative 
projections of her envious, mentally unbalanced mother. Her persistence in 
individual psychotherapy and our joint persistence in supervisory sessions 
led to J’s gradual differentiation from her mother’s negative projective iden-
tifications and from the negative projective identifications of T in their thera-
peutic situation. As a new therapist, she was learning to retain “a mind of 
her own.”25
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METHODOLOGY FOR SUPERVISION, TEACHING, AND 
ADMINISTRATION
I maintain a balance between teaching, supervising, and administrat-
ing. Teaching in the American Association of Pastoral Counselors (AAPC)–
approved curriculum of the Alamance Institute for Pastoral Counseling doc-
toral program carries a responsibility to impart a broad array of didactic 
content necessary for the formation of pastoral counselors in training. On 
the other hand, in leading group process, group case conferences, and indi-
vidual supervision I deploy an analytic, interpersonal supervisory approach. 
Excluding the concrete details of center administration, teaching, and 
supervision, I specify three aspects of my supervisory methodology: my su-
pervisory style, the supervisory approaches I take with specific students, and the 
occasional supervisory stances I take with students to cope with the educa-
tional and interpersonal crises that arise from time to time. I think of my su-
pervisory style as congruent with my Myers-Briggs type, which is I/E,NTJ. 
In this mode, I take on an analytic attitude of active, receptive listening (rev-
erie) that leads to interpretations—all within the parameters of a carefully 
monitored setting. Adjunct to my supervisory style are modifications of that 
style. I call the first modification my supervisory approach, which takes into 
consideration the unique interpersonal style and gifts of the trainee. In this 
mode, I pay attention to how much or little structure, support, or confron-
tation the trainee needs in order to learn from the supervisory experience. 
My supervisory approach is the application of my style of supervision to the 
specific needs and character structure of a particular student. 
Finally, when a trainee has a personal or professional crisis, I assume 
a supervisory stance that is my adjusted and temporary approach to any 
sudden change in the trainee’s capacity to function. For example, with my 
trainee J (above), I became a bit more active and structured when she arrived 
in a state of panic or despair for supervision of her work with T. As the crisis 
resolved, usually within the same session, I was able to return to my super-
visory approach. In Kleinian terms, I view J’s crises as movements into and 
out of the paranoid-schizoid position, and the supervisory approaches, or 
stances, I took represent my shifts to remain congruent/symmetric with her 
state of mind. However, with some trainees, their crisis does not improve 
rapidly, if at all. In these cases my supervisory stance becomes my new su-
pervisory approach.
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HERMENEUTICS AND SUPERVISION OF PASTORAL COUNSELING
In 1881, Anna O described her psychotherapeutic work with Dr. Josef 
Breuer as the “talking cure.” Her metaphor has since become a touchstone 
for the work of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.26 From cradle to grave, 
it is through speech, text, and dialogue that humans come to self-under-
standing in relation to each other. Christians, Jews, and Muslims are known 
as the “people of the book.” All ancient texts began as oral traditions, stories 
people told each other and handed down for generations until they were 
written and redacted to reach their current canonical form.27 From children’s 
bedtime stories and prayers to rites for commendation of the dying, we are 
formed, nurtured, and carried through life by words. 
Anton Boisen saw persons as “living human documents.”28 Supervi-
sion of psychotherapy is also done through speech, writing, and dialogue. 
Theology, theories of psychotherapy, codes of ethics, learning, and super-
vision are conveyed through the media of speech, text, and conversation. 
For Ricoeur, myth and symbols emerge from the primal origins of pre-ver-
bal human experience, both historically and developmentally. Myth and 
symbol are the taproots of human self-understanding, and they converge 
to form speech and writing.29 As such, “the text” becomes his metaphor for 
self-reflection. Ricoeur applies his model of the text to three types of en-
quiry: narrative in literature, exegesis in biblical studies, and the mind as a 
text explored by psychoanalysis.30 In each, he finds a threefold hermeneuti-
cal process (“hermeneutical circle”) through which persons move into deep-
er self-understanding.31 Parenthetically, the level of myth and symbol for 
Ricoeur corresponds with the Kleinian understanding of unconscious phan-
tasy as described by Isaacs, as the first appearance of mentation to occur 
as impulse crosses over from soma to psyche.32 Hanna Segal also explores 
symbol formation.33 Bion gives a similar account of these phenomena in his 
description of alpha function, which converts unconscious mental contents 
into consciously representable symbols and thoughts that are ready for use 
in dreaming and thinking.34 
For Ricoeur, literature, theology, and psychoanalytic theory describe 
human action in that they are imitative of human action. Language is mi-
metic, and mimesis is a key concept for him. Children learn by imitation, 
and, although it is less obvious, so do adults. Drawing on Aristotle’s Poet-
ics, Ricoeur grounds his textual description of human activity as imitative, 
or mimetic.35 Emerging from primal origins in gesture and symbol, mimesis 
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occurs in three “moments”: mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3. In its first mo-
ment (mimesis1), people imitate or represent human action through the use 
of symbol, metaphor, and language.36 Language in mimesis1 is spontaneous 
but not thought out and corresponds to free association in psychotherapy. 
Language in mimesis2 takes the form of the plot in literature. Its parallel in 
psychotherapy is thinking theoretically and analytically so as to make inter-
pretations. In literature, mimesis3 is the moment in which the reader receives, 
appropriates, and is transformed by the narrative she has read. Reading and 
application of the story is governed by the capacity of the reader to receive 
and grasp the message. In drama, the audience is moved and enriched by 
the tragedy or comedy they view. Like mimesis3, the imaginative hypotheses 
known in psychotherapy as interpretations are integrated into the patient’s 
lived experience, and the patient is transformed by new self-understanding. 
In biblical studies, as the reader encounters a text, his first interpretive 
step consists of an initial pre-grasp of the text’s content as a whole (under-
standing). The second level is written discourse in which ostensive refer-
ence, such as gesture, diminishes. The mental intention of the speaker is no 
longer accessible in the text because the hearer (now the reader) cannot ask 
the speaker (the author of the ancient text) what he meant by a particular 
statement. We cannot get “behind the text,” so to speak. So, the meaning of 
the text on the page has become autonomous from the mind of its author. 
At the third level, the moment of personal appropriation arrives when the 
claims of the text are applied to the here-and-now life experience of the in-
terpreter. Here the text’s meaning emerges “in front of the text.”37 
In the contemporary life of the worshiping community, the congrega-
tion receives the message as proclaimed—as a kerygma that emerges from 
the pastor’s critical-constructive exegetical interaction with the ancient text 
as well as from his pastoral care in current relationships with the congre-
gation regarding their present needs and their orientation toward the fu-
ture (shared sense of mission). For Ricoeur, the hermeneut must relate in 
the present moment, informed by the past while anticipating the future. The 
movement from exegesis to proclamation to reception of the message con-
stitutes the hermeneutical circle. The outcome of the text’s message emerges 
“in front of the text” as the hearers are transformed by its meaning for them 
today.38 
In the supervisor’s understanding and acceptance of the supervisee, 
who is awash in an upwelling of his countertransference that is evoked by 
the patient’s transference, grace and liberation may happen. The superviso-
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ry couple, working in the immediacy of the present moment, beholds the in-
tersection of three histories: the patient’s, the trainee’s, and the supervisor’s. 
The power of interpretation opens a way into a future for the therapist-pa-
tient couple and for the supervisor-supervisee couple. Often this “way” is 
not merely psychological understanding but the experience of something 
sacred. Pastoral counselors are familiar, from our training in biblical studies, 
with the hermeneutical task of “demythologizing” the text. Ricoeur notes 
that we can no longer go back to the primitive naiveté of children, or of an-
cient people, with their immediacy of belief: 
If we can no longer live with the great symbolisms of the sacred in accor-
dance with the original belief in them, we modern men [sic] aim at a sec-
ond naiveté in and through criticism. . . . It is by interpreting that we can 
hear again. . . . This second naiveté aims to be the post-critical equivalent 
of the pre-critical hierophany.39 
Similarly, patient, therapist, and/or supervisor can be liberated by the post-
critical realism of interpretations, given and received in dialogue, “to hear 
again” and to experience joy in living life. 
My pastoral theological methodology follows the thought of Theodore 
W. Jennings, Jr., who introduced the concepts of first-, second-, and third-
order theological thinking.40 First-order theology, also known as “embedded 
theology,” 
is the collection of phrases, narratives and liturgies which are employed 
to give expression to the way in which a person or community’s life is 
related to God. 
Second order religious language (theology) is the explication and critical 
evaluation or appropriation of their basic meaning, with the more or less 
provisional result yielding a theological judgment or proposal. When an 
entire community of faith attains or accepts the same judgment, the result 
is a doctrine.
Theological method, including pastoral theology, is a third order reflec-
tion upon the way in which such judgments are made and a critical evalu-
ation of the appropriateness of such procedures.”41
Deliberative theology, or second-order theology, denotes the critical biblical 
studies and the historical and systematic theology introduced in seminary.42 
In pastoral counseling and supervision, third-order theological reflection in-
volves working with patients and supervisees in ways that respect their em-
beddedness in a particular cultural, spiritual, or theological location (their 
first-order language of faith).43 A third-order theological perspective also en-
ables us to join supervisees and/or patients in the second-order reflective 
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work of deliberating about their ethical/theological struggles to live authen-
tically and responsibly in relationships, including psychotherapy.44 Person-
ality growth can foster shifts or crises in people’s faith and values that re-
quire our collaboration in dialogue. In sum, the work of Ricoeur and Jennings 
provides a hermeneutical and theological frame for the application of Klei-
nian theory to supervision. 
Collaboration in dialogue is especially important in the intercultural re-
lationships that are increasingly a part of life in our post-colonial global vil-
lage. Following the work of Melinda McGarrah Sharp, we can explore how 
misunderstandings that are so much a part of couples, family, and group life 
become deeper and more frequent within intercultural relationships, where 
people tend to overlook differences in social, cultural, and theological/spiri-
tual locations.45 The same respectful and open attitude is crucial to supervi-
sion with persons of different gender identity and sexual orientation. 
The embeddedness of others in theologies, cultures, gender-specific 
perspectives, sexual orientation, and languages different from our own pos-
es a powerful ethical challenge to supervision. The thought of Emmanu-
el Levinas guides me here.46 The fallacy of clinging to the totalism of only 
one perspective is exposed by face-to-face encounters with other persons. 
The “face of the other” not only exposes my own egocentricity and love 
of “sameness,” it introduces an obligation for responsibility to this “other” 
who not only embodies difference but stands for the absolute Otherness of 
God who loves both of us.47 
For me, the wonderful and challenging otherness of my wife and all 
women introduces feminist perspectives that enrich and challenge me every 
day. Drawing on the work of Catherine LaCugna and Elizabeth Johnson, Pa-
mela Cooper-White sketches “a relational understanding of God.”48 God, in 
the three persons of the Trinity, is imaged by the fourth-century understand-
ing of perichoresis “in the complete, equal, and mutual interpermeation of the 
three persons.”49 She cites LaCugna to say,
Perichoresis expressed the idea that the three divine persons mutually 
inhere in one another, draw life from one another, “are” what they are 
by relation to one another. Perichoresis means being-in-one-another, per-
meation without confusion. No person exists by him/herself. . . . To be a 
divine person is to be by nature in relation to other persons.50 
As the Trinity, God models for humans that human relationships should 
extend cross the lines of gender, race, cultures and faith communities. 
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GROUP THEORY
The predominantly two-person focus of psychotherapeutic theories is 
balanced in pastoral counseling supervision by the use of group process the-
ories. In our doctoral program, group conferences occur in multiple modali-
ties, from didactic or teaching seminars to case conferences to interperson-
al relations seminars. Peers and supervisors have much to teach and learn 
in dialogue with each other in group seminars. My style of work, even in 
didactic seminars, is dialogical. The psychoanalytic literature is not “light 
reading,” and a straight lecture format both enhances resistance to learning 
and puts people to sleep. I want people to wrestle with the concepts, with 
the authors, with each other, and with me. Dialogue moves learning from 
the head to the gut, making new understandings more readily available 
to incorporate into practice. Consistent with my Kleinian orientation, my 
main group theorists are Bion and Foulkes.51 Group case conferences are the 
format in which supervisees most easily experience and internalize Bion’s 
model of the work group.52 On the other hand, the relatively unstructured na-
ture of interpersonal relations seminars provoke the most anxiety and most 
effectively expose the group’s operant basic assumptions.53
For the past twenty years, Bion’s group theoretical perspective has 
helped me stay grounded in the sense of what is happening in the moment 
in group process. My supervisee J found group to be a horrible experience. 
The issue she had most in common with her all-female peer group was the 
fact that all had had painful relationships with their mothers, and each peer 
projected her bad mother issues onto others who attempted to engage them. 
As a result, the group functioned mostly as a fight-flight basic assumption 
group, although two peers paired and/or sub-grouped to avoid conflict due 
to a longstanding friendship that preceded their participation in the train-
ing program.54 Based on her longstanding therapy experience and previous 
CPE residency, J repeatedly tried to engage her paranoid and prickly peers 
around the unspoken dynamics in the room, and around her own negative 
transference-laden concerns that she was not being heard or understood. 
In response, the group scapegoated her and ignored or rationalized her at-
tempts to engage. J responded with periods of silent, impotent rage until her 
next attempt to engage. 
Faculty group leaders had little more success with engagement of the 
group at deeper levels of trust as the group proceeded to “learn by vigorous 
denying.”55 Interpretations of the group’s behavior as an acting out or as a 
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transference of their respective family of origin dynamics56 were resisted in 
the group format, but they all did better work in the safer environment of 
individual supervision.
COUPLES THERAPY
Even though it is obvious that my primary theoretical orientation is 
an individual, Kleinian object relations psychoanalytic perspective, nearly 
one third of my clinical practice is done with couples. I am intrigued by Da-
vid and Jill Scharffs’ concept of “centered holding,”57 which in a traditional 
family depicts the mother holding the baby, the father holding the mother 
and the baby, the extended family holding them, etc., as a succession of con-
centric circles of care that surround the child, mother, and father. The ap-
plication of centered holding to family and couples therapy excites me, and 
their book led me in many productive directions—especially to Klein and 
her followers. 
To me, the most important North American Kleinian author is Robert 
Caper, but the Tavistock Institute of Marital Studies has also had an impact 
on my work.58 My practice and understanding of couples and family thera-
py is informed by Caper’s comparison and contrast of Bion’s container/con-
tained function with Donald Winnicott’s concept of holding. Caper says, 
Holding does not, by definition, present the patient with a proper object. 
Its purpose is to accommodate to the patient in order to reassure him that 
the analyst is not hostile, and for this reason the analyst identifies with the 
patient’s state of mind, and conveys to the patient that he has done so. . . 
. The analyst has not moved the patient into territory that is unfamiliar to 
him, but has, on the contrary moved himself into what is already familiar 
to the patient. . . . In other words, it tends to move the analyst toward the 
good side of the patient’s splitting. 
Containment, on the other hand, does move the patient into unfamiliar 
territory. It presents the patient with an object that has gone beyond iden-
tifying with him to gain some insight into what the patient himself is un-
able to know, namely his own unconscious. This puts the analyst in the 
position of being a proper object, an object that the patient experiences as 
different from himself— . . . not a narcissistic or paranoid-schizoid object. 
At the same time, containment provides the patient with an experience of 
a proper self.59 
Healthy marriages have certain characteristics. First, the container/
contained apparatus described by Bion as pertaining between a healthy 
mother and her child, or between a therapist and patient, exists in some 
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way between the couple—within their relationship. Second, this container/
contained capacity operates as an intrapsychic function within each part-
ner. This internal containment capacity of each partner is the equivalent of 
integration. The external relationship between these two partners—the mar-
riage—provides reciprocal containment by each partner for the other. Peo-
ple need to feel safely contained in order to function creatively.60 
Coleman says the aim of couples therapy is to “promote the capac-
ity of the marriage to function as a container for the individuals within it.” 
Thus, in couples therapy “the patient is the marriage.”61 People seek couples 
therapy when the above conditions of containment do not exist. Looking 
into deeper levels of these phenomena, we are reminded that Bion’s con-
tainer/contained model is rooted in his exploration of the origins of think-
ing. Mother’s reverie enables her to gather the infant’s inchoate projections 
and make sense of them. Over developmental time, the child internalizes 
mother’s capacity to exercise containment and does so for himself. In this 
model, Bion gives an account of what the therapist’s containment promotes 
in the patient. She gives back to the patient, through interpretation, the psy-
chic phenomena that the patient was unable to process, thus enhancing the 
patient’s capacity to think about her own experiences.62 
In contrast to Bion’s “container” model, Winnicott speaks about the 
mother’s “holding” function in which she allows the child to discover his 
own being in his own way and in his own time. However, Winnicott does 
not describe the process going on inside the mother’s/therapist’s mind, the 
functions of projective identification and alpha function. Instead, her “hold-
ing” provides a protective management role that prevents excessive im-
pingements on the developing ego.63 A clinical vignette will illustrate this.
TN is a supervisee doing therapy with AE and BE, a clergy couple in 
their early thirties with three young children and the experience of one mis-
carriage. In her family of origin, BE was physically and verbally abused by 
her mother and at age six was sexually abused by an uncle. Recently, BE has 
further distanced herself from her mother after mother physically assaulted 
one of the couple’s children. In his family of origin, AE was the youngest of 
three siblings and went through the traumas of his brother (the oldest sib-
ling) sexually abusing his sister (the middle child), for which the brother did 
hard time in prison. More recently, the older brother died as a drug addict. 
AE and BE came to couples therapy with a presenting problem of sex-
ual conflict in their marriage. Periods of relatively warm intimacy report-
edly alternate with times when BE gets overwhelmed and retreats, feeling 
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that AE is too sexually needy. In response to BE’s distancing behavior, AE 
becomes tearful but has no words for his tears. They act out these distancing 
behaviors in the couple’s therapy format, demonstrating their incapacity to 
contain the projections of the other. No violence occurs, but neither spouse 
is able to think or relate helpfully when anxiety spikes upward, and silent, 
mutually stuck impasses occur. The couple’s behavior in therapy in effect 
says, “This is what we deal with so often in our relationship.” So, TN works 
with each partner in individual sessions that alternate with sessions using 
a couple’s therapy format to provide the containment for each partner that 
they are unable to provide for each other. 
My supervision of TN explores and interprets the periods of vague 
confusion he has when one or both spouses “get stuck.” AE and BE project 
their confusion into TN, whose mind, at times, becomes numb and unable to 
think—unable to apply alpha function to the feelings of drowning in despair 
that they project into him. We explore the parental couple that each partner 
has internalized, and enacts, in their marriage, and we explore the depleting 
internalized parent-child relationship they transfer onto each other. 
SUPERVISORY THEORY
Decades ago, I worked my way through college by managing a mu-
nicipal swimming pool and teaching swimming lessons to hundreds of kids. 
One of the first lessons I learned was that I could not stand on the deck be-
side the pool and teach water-phobic children to swim. It was imperative 
that I get into the water and invite the students to join me. They needed 
to know that I was there, immediately available, to assuage their fears of 
drowning while learning to swim. At a primal level, supervision of pasto-
ral counseling is the same. I invite my trainees to join me in immersing our-
selves “in the water” of pastoral counseling. Doing so evokes anxiety—often 
a lot of it—in people for whom psychotherapy is a new medium in which to 
practice. They have a high need to know that I am within reach if a “drown-
ing” patient begins to “pull them under.” Needless to say, these dynamics 
also evoke anxiety in me as their supervisor. I will never forget my shock, 
nor the pain of my college lifeguard friend, after a thirteen-year-old child 
drowned while he was on duty. In our business of pastoral counseling, some 
patients do commit suicide or do awful things to themselves and others. 
Fear and anxiety are real for pastoral counselors, and oftentimes realistic. So 
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a major supervisory question is, How do I manage the anxiety that comes 
with the territory?
In their classic book Coping with Conflict, Mueller and Kell approach the 
issues of clinical supervision from the perspective of the anxieties inherent 
in these phenomena.64 They make a number of salient points: Therapists and 
supervisors do not develop through a dispassionate study of the conflicts 
with patients or trainees (the swim instructor and the student must get into 
the pool together for learning to occur.). Patients and trainees are uncannily 
accurate in discovering those things we find distasteful about ourselves and 
that can make us anxious and angry (cf. Kleinian projective identification 
and introjective identification). So, supervision should focus on the sources 
of anxiety in the supervisee and the supervisor, not just the anxiety in the 
patient. For effective use of self, supervisor and supervisee must understand 
the motives, conflicts, and anxieties that are activated by the patient, super-
visee, and supervisor. Trainees begin supervision as neophytes who feel vul-
nerable, inadequate, and uncertain about the supervisor’s criticism. They 
cautiously reveal their uncertainties. Effective supervision allows the trainee 
to lean on the supervisor for support and to struggle with inner conflicts in 
the supervisor’s presence.65 
A Kleinian commentary on the issues raised by Mueller and Kell em-
phasizes that anxiety to some degree is inherent in all human interaction. 
“No anxiety” is one of the characteristics of death. Rather, we ask, What 
kind of anxiety is operative? Is it persecutory (paranoid-schizoid, as in fear of 
being attacked or fear of annihilation) or depressive (in the awareness of one’s 
own aggressive impulses, the person becomes anxious that he has damaged 
the love object)? And, to what extent, if any, does the supervisor’s or su-
pervisee’s anxiety interfere with their ability to think and function within a 
normal range? 
I concur with Mueller and Kell that the goal of supervision is learning to 
be therapeutic. This fact is the heart of the learning contract for every pasto-
ral counselor in training. Learning to be therapeutic involves learning to use 
one’s knowledge of personality development in its normal and pathological 
iterations to enhance a patient’s development. Therapists (and supervisors) 
must be able to postpone their reflexive reactions to the patient’s (or super-
visee’s) anxiety-producing behavior in order to metabolize the behavior’s 
dynamic meaning before responding with interpretations. This was a major 
issue with J in her work with T. She had to learn that T’s hostile, confused 
behavior that immobilized and confused her was his means of emotional 
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protection in the violent family context that overwhelmed him. Only as J 
came to understand the dynamic meaning of her own immobilizing anxiety 
and its roots in her traumatic development could she trust herself to engage 
T’s dynamics, using her self-knowledge to interpret his anxiety and foster 
his self-understanding.66 
ANXIETY AS A THEME IN THE HISTORY OF SUPERVISION
A theoretical red thread running through this discussion has been the 
patient’s, supervisee’s, or supervisor’s anxiety as it emerges from the indi-
vidual’s developmental history into therapeutic and supervisory settings. 
Parallel to anxiety’s emergence in the life history of individuals and their 
relationships, it is also helpful to trace the emergence of anxiety as a theme 
of importance in the history of psychoanalytic supervision. Anxiety hysteria and 
anxiety neuroses were present from the beginning in Freud’s thought and 
practice as diagnoses and clinical phenomena,67 but Freud’s own anxiety in 
his mode of doing supervision was neither visible nor discussed. Mary Gail 
Frawley-O’Dea and Joan E. Sarnat describe Freud’s classical analysis and 
supervision as a 
one-person model of clinical work, with power, knowledge and authority 
resting primarily with the analyst. . . . A relatively healthier, more fully 
analyzed, more completely conscious analyst takes on a patient who is a 
relatively sicker, more conflicted, less conscious individual.68 
This classical model rested on positivist scientific assumptions of the ana-
lyst as an external observer and was patient-centered. The supervisor was 
viewed as an uninvolved, objective expert who was focused on the patient’s 
mind and the use of correct technique. Supervision was an authoritative-
ly didactic imparting of information to the receptive and dependent super-
visee-learner. It was expected that the supervisee would work through her 
emotional conflicts in a separate training analysis. Any anxiety of the super-
visor or the supervisee rarely got mentioned in the literature.
By 1958 in the United States, ego psychology was the regnant mode 
of psychoanalysis. Ekstein and Wallerstein described the “resistances” of 
supervisees, but they seemed incurious about the anxiety driving these re-
sistances. They enumerated, quite helpfully, a long list of “problems about 
learning” that they defined as particular ways in which the supervisee seeks 
to learn from the supervisor. These include: ‘learning by vigorous denial’; 
‘learning by submission’; the ‘mea culpa’ attitude of learning; the ‘prob-
lem of finding a problem’ style of learning; learning ‘on the run’ because 
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of over-involvement elsewhere; the problem of ‘skepticism vs. faith’ in the 
treatment process; and the problem of trying to ‘convert supervision into 
personal psychotherapy.’69 However, the psychodynamic meaning of these 
problems about learning was largely to be addressed in the trainee’s own 
personal training analysis, which occurred outside the supervisory context. 
Stated in Kleinian terms, there was a tendency in earlier models of supervi-
sion for the anxiety of supervisor and supervisee to be split off and projected 
into the training analysis or the supervisor’s own personal analysis. 
 By 1972 the attitude toward anxiety was changing in supervisory 
theory. Although Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat did not know about the work 
of Mueller and Kell, the latter directly approached anxiety in the supervi-
sory context in their new book. For Mueller and Kell, anxiety was front and 
center. They spoke of three key behavioral options in response to anxiety: 
anxiety binding, anxiety avoiding, and anxiety approaching behavior. They saw 
the first two options as unhelpful and efforts to approach anxiety as the 
most efficacious.70 
In 2001 Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat completed the full turn to an “anx-
iety-focused” supervisory model, founded in object relations theory. Their 
focus is primarily on the self psychology of Kohut as well as the object rela-
tions theories of psychoanalysts such as Klein and Winnicott.71 It is here that 
the Kleinian impact on supervisory theory begins to emerge. Klein and the 
Kleinians were the first to finally offer a full developmental description of 
the role of anxiety in human life, from birth and through the life cycle. For 
Kleinians, the supervisor is still an authoritative expert but is also a recep-
tacle for feeling states induced by the patient and the supervisee. 
This history leads Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat to the postmodern “re-
lational model” of psychoanalysis in which the supervisor is seen as “an 
embedded participant” rather than “an objective expert,” engaging in a “su-
pervisory-matrix-centered relational model of supervision.”72 My own posi-
tion, as stated throughout this paper, is Kleinian, albeit with acceptance of 
many of the interpersonal aspects of the relational model—aspects that are 
really Kleinian in origin. For example, Bion’s learning theory is thoroughly 
grounded in projective and introjective functions that are the basis of all hu-
man conversation. The simple greeting “Hello” is a projection by person 
A, who acknowledges the presence of person B. When B responds in kind, 
she acknowledges the presence of A. The result is a mutual introjection of 
friendly recognition. Hundreds or even thousands of reciprocations may 
follow, as a supervision develops or a psychoanalytic treatment develops, as 
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the case may be. The Kleinian therapist or supervisor is always attentive to 
the quality and quantity of anxiety in these projections and to the possible 
meaning of any fluctuations in this anxiety. 
TRANSFERENCE, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, AND THE TEACH/
TREAT DILEMMA IN SUPERVISION
I close this paper with a discussion of relationships between transfer-
ence and countertransference, on the one hand, and the so-called “teach/
treat” dilemma in supervision on the other. The phenomena of transference 
and countertransference have been present in psychoanalytic work from the 
beginning (1880–82), ever since Josef Breuer‘s work with Anna O.73 Breuer 
did not recognize either concept until Freud identified them during their 
consultations, a realization that disturbed and frightened Breuer, causing 
him to flee both his treatment of Anna O and the fledgling discipline of psy-
choanalysis.74 However, the case of Anna O illustrates two key psychoana-
lytic issues regarding transference and countertransference. First, they are 
powerful forces of unconscious origin in both the patient and the therapist. 
Second, these forces have the potential to rupture the therapeutic relation-
ship through acting out, and/or fear of acting out, by the patient and/or the 
therapist. As Joan Berzoff summarizes, 
Freud initially thought that transference could and should be avoided, 
but he would shortly discover, in the case of Dora, that transference was 
an unavoidable part of the talking cure. Even later he came to see transfer-
ence not as an impediment, but as the major vehicle for psychoanalysis.75 
Similarly, countertransference was originally understood as derived 
from neurotic aspects of the therapist that get stimulated by the patient’s 
transference.76 It was seen by Freud and his early followers as an indication 
that the analyst needed more analysis. In many cases, including the case of 
my supervisee J and her countertransference toward the little boy T (above), 
therapists do indeed need more psychotherapy. This has been, and always 
will be, a crucial issue in psychoanalysis and its supervision. However, for 
decades it was an issue that received little serious study. Reflecting on the 
large body of psychoanalytic literature that had accumulated by 1953, Hein-
rich Racker observed wryly, 
In case histories countertransference is seldom mentioned, still less treat-
ed with any profundity. To my mind these facts are due . . . to a resistance. 
Among analytic subjects countertransference is treated somewhat like a 
child of whom the parents are ashamed.77 
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Avoidance of the study of countertransference began to abate in the 1940s 
thanks to Klein’s work in developing the concepts of projection, introjection, 
projective identification, and introjective identification. These tools enabled 
analysts to develop a more mature understanding of countertransference. 
Object relations theory moved away from Newtonian and positivist para-
digms of the analyst as “objective external observer.” Changes in the view 
of countertransference were symmetric with the shift in the scientific com-
munity from Newtonian assumptions to Einsteinian understandings about 
scientific observation. The observer’s act of observing has effects on the ob-
served, and vice versa. Then in 1950 a major theoretical shift occurred with 
the publication of Paula Heimann’s article “On Countertransference.” She 
said, 
The analyst’s response to his patient within the analytic situation repre-
sents one of the most important tools for his work. The analyst’s counter-
transference is an instrument of research into the patient’s unconscious. . 
. . The aim of the analyst’s own analysis is . . . to enable him to sustain the 
feelings which are stirred in him, as opposed to discharging them (as the 
patient does), in order to subordinate them to the analytic task in which 
he functions as the patient’s mirror reflection.78 
The next conceptual step in was made by Roger Money-Kyrle, whose 
thesis is stated in the title of his article “Normal Countertransference and 
Some of Its Deviations.” He wrote, 
We used to think of [countertransference] mainly as a personal distur-
bance to be analyzed away in ourselves. We now also think of it as having 
its causes, and effects, in the patient, and, therefore as an indication of 
something to be analyzed in him. . . . Of course [this] . . . does not imply 
that it has ceased ever to be a serious impediment.79 
Accordingly, Bion (1959) distinguished the “normal” form of projec-
tive identification from the “pathological” one and saw normal projective 
identification as what happens in empathy and in the acquisition of knowl-
edge about other objects and the world.80 In summary, it is never a question 
of whether transference and countertransference are present in therapy or 
supervision. They are ubiquitous. The pertinent questions are rather, What 
is happening in the transference and countertransference?, and What are its 
meanings? 
This Kleinian account of the developmental history of the concepts of 
transference and countertransference provides background to the teach/
treat dilemma that has raged in the supervisory world for sixty-five years. 
Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat81 give an elegant account of the teach/treat de-
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bate from an American psychoanalytic perspective. From both an object re-
lations perspective and a post-modern relational model, I can now assert, 
with Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat, that “a rigid boundary between teach and 
treat is neither desirable nor truly achievable.”82 
In accordance with this position, I will highlight three claims that Fraw-
ley-O’Dea and Sarnat make about the maintenance of a teach/treat balance 
in supervision. First,
It is no longer possible to differentiate the supervisee’s professional from 
her personal growth, or her professional persona from her personality. 
Rather, the professional is personal.83 
 This view maintains that relational supervision cannot be conducted 
effectively without addressing the trainee’s countertransference to her pa-
tient. Their second claim holds that
supervision is most effective when supervisor and supervisee thought-
fully cooperate in ensuring that the “treat” aspect of supervision remains 
indentured to the overarching goal of facilitating the supervisee’s growth 
as a clinician.84 
In my view, therapeutic issues of the trainee are relevant to the supervisory 
work only to the extent that their illumination enables the trainee to use her 
countertransference effectively as she works in and with the patient’s trans-
ference. Finally, Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat claim that
the supervisee is empowered to limit the extent to which supervision fo-
cuses on her own psychology . . . how deeply and broadly her psychic 
processes are available for mutual exploration in supervision.”85 
This last claim is congruent with the AAPC Code of Ethics regarding 
the maintenance of safe boundaries in our work with both supervisees and 
patients. These boundaries apply both to these relationships and to care-
ful maintenance of the educational setting in which the people who work 
in these relationships develop and pursue their objectives in the teaching, 
learning, and practice of pastoral counseling. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have employed several theoretical and theological per-
spectives to reflect upon my supervision of pastoral counseling. These per-
spectives included Kleinian psychoanalytic theory; Paul Ricoeur’s her-
meneutical approach to “texts” in literature, biblical interpretation, and 
psychoanalysis; the theological methodology of T. W. Jennings and the pro-
vocative contributions of three feminist theologians (Pamela Cooper-White, 
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Catherine LaCugna, and Elizabeth Johnson); the intercultural theory of Me-
linda McGarrah Sharp; the modalities of key theorists of group, couples, 
family, and play therapy; and the supervisory theories of Rudolp Ekstein 
and Robert Wallerstein, William Mueller and Bill Kell, and Mary Gail Fraw-
ley-O’Dea and Joan Sarnat. These perspectives have been applied to two 
pastoral supervision cases to explore a number of dynamic themes that re-
cur in pastoral supervision. These theoretical and theological perspectives 
serve as “maps” that guide my practice of pastoral counseling supervision. 
As I use them, I seek to demonstrate my proficiency in this practice. 
Descriptively speaking, we pastoral counselors claim that theory and 
theology provide accounts of what we do in practice. In this sense, theory 
and theology are imitative of what we do in practice. Prescriptively speaking, 
theory and theology state what we are to do in practice. Here, our theory and 
theology norm what we do in practice and have ethical implications for our 
professional guild. But imitation, norms, and guilds have no life outside of re-
lationships—dialogue with peers in which we reflect on, learn from, and re-
vise what we do and why we do it. Reflection on practice occurs in dialogue. 
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